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  • Introducing: LX
  • Main Features
    • Social Features
  • Reliability
  • High Liquidity
  • High Performance
  • Simple Trading
  • Diversity
  • Interoperability/Bridge
  • User Support
  • Transparency
  • Security
  • The Problem
    • Negative Consequences of Centralization
  • The Solution
    • Security Solutions as a Decentralized Exchange
  • LX: A Decentralized Social Trading Platform
    • Lux Exchange DAO
  • Decentralized Application
  • User Experience
    • Easy to use
  • Accounts, Wallets, and Keys
  • Authentication
  • Features
    • Hardware Wallets
  • Portfolios
  • Social Trading
  • People Based Portfolios
  • Copy Swaps
  • Trading Charts
  • Indicator Alarm Manager
  • Smart Search
  • Watchlist
  • Community Support
    • Decentralized community service
  • Rewarded Content Production/Trading Bots
  • Token Curated Customer Service
  • LX Architecture
    • LX Architecture Comparison
  • eToro
  • EtherDelta
  • 0x Protocol
  • LX
  • Lux Protocol
    • Lux as a Distributed Autonomous Organization (DAO)
  • Governance
  • Lux Consensus
  • Terminology
  • Election Triggers
  • Attacks
    • Tragedy of Commons
  • Collusion
  • Censorship
  • ASIC Attacks
  • Long Range Attacks
  • Treasury and Bounty
    • Budgeting
  • Bounty
  • Lux Tokenomics
  • Decentralized Liquidity Pool (DLP)
  • Market Maker Fees
  • LX C++ Application Programming Interface (API)
  • Permission Mapping
  • Permission Evaluation Applied to Copy Trading
  • Parallel Permission Evaluation
  • LX Key Capabilities
  • Atomic Swaps
  • Facilitating Liquidity
  • Exchange Traded Funds
  • Crypto-asset Custody for Gateways
  • Cold Wallet
  • Smart coins
  • Crypto-asset Volatility
  • Gold as Collateral
  • Incentives
  • Interest Rate
  • Development Roadmap
  • LUX Constitution and Ricardian Contracts
  • Lux Protocol
  • DEX Core Platform
  • DApp UI/UX
  • Hardware Wallet Integration
  • Quality Assurance
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ASIC Attacks

Two opportunities for an ASIC attacks exist in this protocol - during partition, and cheating timeouts in Finality. For ASIC attacks during Partitions, the Rate at which bonds are unstaked is non-linear, and for networks with large partitions the rate is orders of magnitude slower then expected gains from an ASIC attack. 20 For ASIC attacks during Finality, the vulnerability allows for byzantine validators who have a bonded stake to wait for confirmations from other nodes and inject their votes with a collaborating PoH generator. The PoH generator can then use its faster ASIC to generate 500ms worth of hashes in less time, and allow for network communication between the PoH generator and the collaborating nodes. But, if the PoH generator is also byzantine, there is no reason why the byzantine generator wouldn't have communicated the exact counter when they expect to insert the failure. This scenario is no different than a PoH generator and all the collaborators sharing the same identity and having a single combined stake and only using 1 set of hardware.

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Last updated 2 years ago

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